OPINION ON THE DRAFT LAW AMENDING THE LAW ON THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EURO

TO
NATALIA KISELOVA
SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

ROSEN ZHELYAZKOV
PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

TEMENUZHKA PETKOVA
MINISTER OF FINANCE

DELYAN DOBREV,
CHAIR, COMMITTEE ON BUDGET AND FINANCE OF THE 51st NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

COPY:
DIMITAR RADEV
GOVERNOR, BULGARIAN NATIONAL BANK

OPINION

RE: Draft Law Amending and Supplementing the Law on the Introduction of the Euro in the Republic of Bulgaria, reg. No. 51-502-01-36.

Dear Sirs and Madams,

On behalf of the undersigned organisations, we express our joint position on the draft law amending and supplementing the Law on the Introduction of the Euro in the Republic of Bulgaria. We represent thousands of Bulgarian employers from dozens of different industries and are united in our position that the proposals made pose an enormous risk to the business environment in Bulgaria.

I. Early introduction of the obligation for dual price display as of 8 August 2025 and extension of the ban on price changes

Envisaged amendment:

In paragraph 2, the words "one month after the date of entry into force of the Decision on the adoption of the euro" are to be replaced with "on 8 August 2025", and the words "12 months after the date of the introduction of the euro in the Republic of Bulgaria" with "on 31 December 2026".

The change introduced, which provides for the mandatory dual display of prices to begin as of 8 August 2025, gives rise to serious difficulties, especially for economic operators using software solutions for pricing and labelling management. This early bringing-forward of the deadline — only a week after the publication of the European regulation — represents a substantial adjustment to the deadline hitherto established and applied under the current law, for which businesses have already begun preparation, investment, and operational measures from the very start of the process of adopting the LIEB (Law on the Introduction of the Euro in Bulgaria), more than 18 months ago.

Besides leading to a serious administrative and organisational burden for enterprises, this early introduction breaches the principles of legal predictability and proportionality. More importantly, the new deadlines come into direct conflict with Article 19 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, which guarantees free economic initiative. The adoption of restrictions that in practice block the possibility of adapting pricing policy to market dynamics goes beyond the limits of normal State regulation and may be interpreted as interference in free competition.

The administrative restriction or freezing of prices, especially under a market economy, is not only unjustified from a legal standpoint but also economically inefficient. Such measures distort competition and create an environment in which the effective mechanisms of supply and demand are suppressed.

II. Ban on price changes during the dual display period

The text envisaged in the draft:

"(4) During the dual display period, traders may not increase the prices of the goods and services they offer where this is not justified by objective economic factors."

in essence significantly expands the temporal scope of Article 25 of the LIEB. Instead of applying only during the dual circulation period (1 month), the restriction is extended until the end of the dual display phase — i.e. for a period of over 17 months. We consider that this leads to a de facto freezing of prices for a long time interval, without any express and clear economic justification. Such an extension of the restrictions significantly exceeds the scope of a temporary measure for the protection of consumers and, again, conflicts with the principles of free economic initiative guaranteed in the Constitution.

The formation of final retail consumer prices depends on a complex set of dynamic factors — including fluctuations in supply prices, changes in consumer demand, seasonal influences, transport and logistics costs, wage growth, overheads, commercial rents, marketing, and write-off costs. For imported products, currency risk, customs, and logistics costs must also be taken into account, and the final price also includes 20% VAT.

Moreover, in commercial practice a mixed pricing model is widely applied, whereby certain items are offered at a minimal profit or even none at all, in order to achieve optimal positioning of the core consumer basket. A change in the price of one product is often linked to the need for offsetting changes in other product categories, which makes fixing price levels impossible without disrupting the business logic.

Such intervention in market mechanisms, especially over an extended period, may lead to distortion of supply, restriction of choice, and ultimately to adverse effects for consumers themselves.

III. Technical requirements for price display

Envisaged amendment:

In Article 16, the following amendments and additions are made:

In paragraph 1, after the words "of the same size", a comma is inserted and "type and colour" is added.

"(2) The two prices are accompanied by an indication of the respective currency, a distinguishing sign or abbreviation, made in the same font size as under paragraph 1, allowing them to be easily recognised."

Comment:

Imposing this new requirement at such short notice before the start of the actual obligation for dual price display creates serious difficulties for traders, especially those working with specialised electronic pricing systems. These systems usually require considerable time and effort for technical adaptation, and until now there had been no such requirement in the legislation.

It should be emphasised that throughout the entire preparation and implementation phase of the LIEB — over 18 months, including the period of public consultation and voting — no such requirement was envisaged. As a result, numerous traders have already completed, or are at an advanced stage of, the synchronisation between the legal requirements and the software architecture of their systems. The retroactive introduction of a new criterion at such a late moment places businesses in an objective impossibility to respond adequately in time, especially where interfaces with visual constraints or pre-created templates for the design of electronic labels are concerned.

Besides creating a logistical and technological difficulty, such a measure undermines confidence in the stability and predictability of the regulatory process, which is key to business planning and legal certainty.

Envisaged amendment:

"(5) When giving change in euro under paragraph 1, or the amount paid in euro under paragraph 3, the trader shall provide information on the monetary value of the change or the amount paid in leva, upon the consumer's request."

Comment:

The wording of the text leaves uncertainty as to the form in which the information on the lev equivalent is to be provided — whether an oral statement would suffice or written confirmation is required.

It is important to take into account that a requirement for written form would lead to a technically impossible and operationally unfeasible situation in practice. This is especially true for high-turnover outlets or automated checkout systems, where such a procedure would slow down service and create organisational chaos. Clearly defining that an oral statement is sufficient will remove the ambiguity and allow traders to comply with the requirement without excessive administrative burden.

IV. Control powers and duplication of functions between State bodies

Comment:

The draft law provides for control powers over compliance with the requirements of the LIEB to be assigned both to the National Revenue Agency (NRA) and to the Consumer Protection Commission (CPC). This expansion of the institutional scope of control appears neither effective nor justified by practical necessity.

Commercial entities are already subject to strict and consistent control from a number of State institutions. Assigning new powers to additional bodies, without a clear delineation of competences, will lead to duplication of functions and an increase in the administrative burden, both for businesses and for the control structures themselves.

It should be particularly emphasised that the Commission for Protection of Competition (CPC/КЗК) already possesses existing statutory powers to monitor and analyse market processes, including price dynamics and possible abuses. Expanding the powers of the Consumer Protection Commission in this direction, in the absence of additional resources or coordinated mechanisms, may lead to ineffective control and a risk of overlap and administrative arbitrariness.

Envisaged amendment:

Creation of Article 55a with the following content:

§ 10. A new Article 55a is created:

"Provision of information and assistance

Article 55a. (1) In the performance of their official duties, the officials of the Consumer Protection Commission and the National Revenue Agency shall have the right to require, within time limits set by them, from any natural or legal person any information relevant to the inspections carried out, including on the level of prices for a period determined by the official, the start date of which is no earlier than 1 January 2024, on the pricing method, on supply and production prices, on each of the components included in the final sale price of the good or service, as well as data relevant to the correct application of this law.

(2) The control under paragraph 1 may be carried out on premises where economic activity or the management of economic activity is conducted — production premises, shops, warehouses, offices, bureaux, and the like — as well as on premises and places where accounting, commercial, and other documents or information carriers related to the activity of the controlled persons are kept.

(3) Every person subject to inspection is obliged to provide assistance and not to obstruct the control authorities in the performance of their duties. (4) The persons from whom information and assistance have been requested are obliged to provide them within the time limit set by the officials and may not invoke production, commercial, or other secrets protected by law."

Comment on the proposed text:

The wording in paragraphs 1 and 4 raises serious concerns as to the lawfulness and proportionality of the control mechanisms. The absence of clear parameters regarding the time limits for providing information creates the conditions for arbitrariness. In order to ensure effectiveness and the protection of traders' rights, provision should be made for the possibility of extending the time limits where the initial period is objectively insufficient.

Particularly worrying is the envisaged removal of the possibility of invoking commercial or production secrets protected by law. Such a provision is in direct conflict with the framework in force under the Law on Protection of Competition, which contains an entire chapter regulating the procedure for handling confidential information. Analogous mechanisms are absent from the LIEB, as they are from consumer legislation, and this opens up legal uncertainty and serious risks of infringing fundamental economic rights and the competitiveness of economic entities.

In conclusion, the expansion of the scope of State control must be carefully considered and must be in full compliance with the principles of the rule of law, legal certainty, and the protection of commercial secrets.

V. Discriminatory nature of the new obligations for large traders and risk to competition

Envisaged amendment:

"Provision of information by traders

Article 55b. (1) During the period of dual price display of goods and services, traders whose activity consists in the retail sale of foodstuffs, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, non-food goods, and medicinal products, with a turnover for the previous year of over BGN 10,000,000, are obliged to publish, on the last day of each working week, in a machine-readable format allowing data extraction, on their websites, information on the final sale prices of all goods offered for sale during that period from the composition of the large consumer basket.

(2) Where, in the trader's individual outlets, the same goods are offered at different final prices during the same period, the data under paragraph 1 are published separately for each outlet.

(3) The Consumer Protection Commission creates and maintains a publicly accessible internet portal and publishes weekly information on price movements on the basis of the information published pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2."

Comment:

The proposed regulation creates impermissible differentiated treatment of one specific group of economic operators — large retailers — and does so without a clear justification as to why they in particular should be subject to additional obligations. In essence, this constitutes a discriminatory rule that introduces disproportionate obligations, with no analogue for the other market participants.

From the standpoint of competition law, the proposed provision creates a real risk of restricting competition, since it obliges certain traders to disclose sensitive information about their current pricing behaviour in near real time. This creates an artificial transparency that is not natural to the fast-moving consumer goods market. Although the stated aim is better consumer information, in practice the provision benefits precisely other traders, who will be able to track, analyse, and align their own pricing policy with that of their competitors — in breach of the fundamental principle that every undertaking must independently determine its commercial strategy.

According to the Guidelines on the Exchange of Information between Competitors (§ 20 of Decision No. 1778/20.12.2011 of the CPC), any form of coordination, including through the intermediation of a public authority, that reduces uncertainty between market participants may lead to a restriction of competition. The current practice of the CPC confirms this: Decision No. 81/23.01.2025 emphasises that, with a high degree of price transparency for interchangeable products, traders can easily adjust their policy, which may lead to price convergence and the elimination of competition, including at the regional level.

Furthermore, the CPC has already expressed a critical opinion on a similar initiative: during the discussion on the creation of a Central Register for Food Traceability in 2023, the Commission clearly indicated that a requirement to publish sensitive commercial information could infringe Article 15(1) of the LPC and Article 101(1) of the TFEU (Decision No. 347/06.04.2023).

An additional problem is the disproportionate administrative burden for the traders subject to the new obligations. They will have to:
– maintain their own database in a publicly accessible form on their website;
– simultaneously send the same information to the Ministry of Economy and Industry in another machine-readable format, according to instructions that have not yet been publicly announced;
– adapt existing systems that are already burdened by the process of the transition to the euro and by increased regulatory control.

This not only creates a duplication of obligations but also makes their fulfilment technically and organisationally difficult, if not impossible, without prior clarity on the technical requirements.

Conclusion:

Although the proposed measure aims to help consumers through better information, the actual effect may be the opposite:
– a breach of the level playing field between market participants;
– the creation of conditions for price alignment between competitors;
– an increase in barriers to entry for new participants;
– a disruption of the balance between market freedom and State intervention.

In view of the foregoing, we consider that the proposed provision should be reconsidered or entirely removed from the draft law, taking into account not only the good intentions but also the serious legal and economic risks that it entails.

VI. Disproportionate increase of pecuniary penalties — risk to business sustainability

Envisaged amendment:

Article 59(5)(6): a pecuniary penalty is imposed in the amount of 0.5 per cent of the turnover realised for the previous financial year, and, in the event of a repeated infringement, in the amount of 1 per cent of the turnover realised for the previous financial year; where there is no turnover realised for the previous financial year, a pecuniary penalty is imposed in the amount of 0.5 per cent of the turnover realised up to the moment the infringement is established for a period no longer than 12 months back, and, in the event of a repeated infringement, in the amount of 1 per cent of the turnover realised up to the moment the infringement is established for a period no longer than 12 months back.

Comment:

The possible imposition, provided for in the draft law, of penalties on an enterprise's entire annual turnover — regardless of the nature and gravity of the infringement — constitutes a disproportionate and potentially destructive measure. Such a penalty may genuinely threaten the survival of a given commercial entity, especially in the context of growing regulatory and market challenges.

It should be taken into account that the proposed mechanism provides for the penalty to be calculated on the enterprise's entire turnover, rather than on the specific turnover or market segment connected with the infringement. This is an extraordinarily restrictive approach, especially given that infringements under the LIEB do not affect fundamental aspects of competition, nor do they lead to structural distortions of the market.

There is a real risk that the penalty will several times exceed the actual harmful effect of the act itself, especially for large traders with high turnover, whose profitability is often low owing to the volume of fixed costs and the price pressure in the sector.

The proposed penalty model is evidently borrowed from the Law on Protection of Competition (LPC), where it applies to serious infringements of the cartel, abuse-of-dominance, or anti-competitive-practices type. Even there, however, the penalty of up to 10% is calculated only on the revenue from sales of products affected by the infringement, and not on the company's total turnover. In the case of the LIEB, however, an analogous penalty is proposed without taking into account that the subject matter of the infringements is entirely different — most often connected with technical or administrative non-compliance, rather than with a distortion of the competitive order.

Penalties calculated on turnover are, by their very nature, a drastic intervention in the economic stability of enterprises and must be applied only in extreme cases and where there is a corresponding public danger. The present draft law, however, does not propose such a differentiation by gravity, but instead sets a uniform and high threshold for every infringement, regardless of the consequences, the intentional nature, or the scope of the infringement.

Conclusion:

In view of the above, we insist on the introduction of a more precise, differentiated, and proportionate system of penalties, tailored to the gravity and consequences of the infringement, as well as to the turnover connected with the specific activity in the course of which it was committed. The wording proposed in the draft law should be reworked so as to be consistent with the principles of fairness and legal certainty, as well as with the need for predictability and economic stability for business under the conditions of the introduction of the euro and increased regulatory pressure.

VII. Breach of the procedural requirements under the Law on Normative Acts (LNA)

Comment:

The procedure for adopting the amendments under consideration to the Law on the Introduction of the Euro in the Republic of Bulgaria (LIEB) does not meet certain requirements laid down in the Law on Normative Acts (LNA) and the Administrative Procedure Code (APC). These include the provision of a period for familiarisation with the changes to the LIEB, as well as the preparation and publication, on the website of the relevant institution, of reports, reasoning for the adoption of the changes, and a preliminary impact assessment. The absence of such a period places participants in legal and economic life in an objective impossibility to prepare and respond in a timely manner, especially given the high degree of complexity and impact of the proposed changes.

The absence of the relevant documentation and justification accompanying the draft law, in turn, does not allow an objective, fact-based assessment to be made of:
– the appropriateness of the proposed measures;
– the expected economic, administrative, and social impact;
– the compliance of the proposed framework with the principles of the rule of law.

This calls into question not only the legitimacy of the process but also the quality of the proposals. These omissions are not formal but substantive — since they impede the conduct of a transparent, democratic, and informed law-making process, as required by Bulgarian and European law.

Conclusion:

In view of the foregoing, we consider that the proposals should be returned for revision and due consultation with the affected parties, including through:
– open publication of the draft;
– provision of a full package of reasoning, impact, and reports;
– provision of a period for public consultation no shorter than that required by law.

Only once these conditions are met will it be possible to speak of a legally valid and publicly legitimate adoption of legislative changes of such scale and consequence.

VII. Additional administrative burden and lack of a transitional period

Comment:

The proposed package of regulations in the draft law, taken as a whole, leads to a serious increase in the administrative burden for the economic entities falling within its scope. The requirements to provide additional data, including in specific technical formats, combined with the absence of any transitional period whatsoever, place businesses in an objective impossibility to adapt to the new obligations without significant difficulties.

This is happening in a context in which traders are already subject to intensive control by numerous regulatory authorities in connection with the preparation for the introduction of the euro, including with regard to price stability, transparency, and consumer protection. The capacity of organisations is already largely engaged with ongoing inspections, software adaptations, staff training, and internal procedures related to the overall transition to the new currency.

In this context, any additional regulatory burden — especially when introduced without sufficient notice and without an adaptation phase — leads to disproportionate difficulties that may compromise both the good-faith application of the law and the overall sustainability of the process of introducing the euro. There is a real risk of an operational blockage in large commercial systems, where the integration of new obligations requires serious coordination between departments, software solution providers, audits, and external consultants.

Conclusion:

We consider that the application of the new requirements should be accompanied by:
– a clearly set out transitional period, corresponding to the real possibilities for business to adapt;
– the limitation of duplicating obligations for reporting and the provision of information;
– an assessment of the administrative burden that each new requirement generates, relative to the already existing commitments imposed in the process of introducing the euro.

Bulgarian business has been a partner of the State throughout the entire path towards our country's accession to the Eurozone. We call on the institutions to continue the dialogue and to work together with Bulgarian business, rather than against it.

The proposals in the draft law pose an enormous risk to the entire business environment. Bulgaria must have a predictable environment for the employers and investors who create the jobs and generate the real economy of our country. Such proposals may, in the long term, harm our country by repelling investors and provoking job losses.

We believe that there is much that can be done to improve conditions for Bulgarian producers and to reduce inflationary pressure. Urgent reforms are needed to support Bulgarian producers, reduce the budget deficit, combat the grey sector, curb the pressure from monopolies and oligopolies, and further measures that will genuinely bring down the growth of final prices as well. Only through dialogue between the institutions and business, and through a balanced and predictable approach, will lawfulness, effectiveness, and trust in the regulatory process be ensured.

Respectfully,

Bulgarian Entrepreneurial Association (BESCO)
Bulgarian Association of Information Technologies (BAIT)
Bulgarian Employers Association Innovative Technologies (BRAIT)
Association for Innovation, Business Services and Technology in Bulgaria (AIBEST)
IAB Bulgaria
Endeavor Bulgaria